Anticipating bailouts: the incentive-conflict model and the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund

Ramon Degennaro and James Thomson

No 9407, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: An examination of the effect of the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund on insured financial institutions in the context of the incentive-conflict model developed by Edward Kane, finding that differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms tend to reaffirm that taxpayer-funded bailouts are a natural outgrowth of the moral-hazard problem that taxpayers face.

Keywords: Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund; Bank stocks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Anticipating bailouts: The incentive-conflict model and the collapse of the Ohio deposit guarantee fund (1995)
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