Large shareholders and market discipline in a regulated industry: a clinical study of Mellon Bank

Joseph Haubrich and James Thomson

No 9803, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: An analysis of the 1987 change in control at Mellon, which was one of only a few banks with a large shareholder. It finds that the large shareholder did not monitor the firm extensively before it experienced performance difficulties, but was able to enforce a management change when problems arose without having to acquire a majority stake.

Keywords: Stockholders; Mellon Bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9803

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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-199803

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