The political economy of foreign bank entry and its impact: theory and a case study

Gabriella Montinola and Ramon Moreno

No 2001-11, Pacific Basin Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Abstract: We apply Becker's (1983) model of lobbying to show that liberalization of foreign bank entry may result from political changes and a fall in domestic bank efficiency caused by lack of competition, which raises the costs to domestic banks of restricting foreign bank entry. We also show that in equilibrium, reform may be too limited to improve efficiency. We use this model and Data Envelopment Analysis techniques to interpret the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines in 1994. Declines in banking efficiency reduced resistance to foreign bank entry, but the effects of liberalization on efficiency were modest.

Keywords: Monetary policy - East Asia; Inflation (Finance) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/pbcpapers/2001/pb01-11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedfpb:2001-11

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Pacific Basin Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Research Library ().