The Systemic Nature of Settlement Fails

Rajkamal Iyer and Marco Macchiavelli

No 2017-07-03, FEDS Notes from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: In this note we analyze the systemic nature of settlement fails – the failure to deliver the agreed upon securities – during the 2007-09 period. Large and protracted settlement fails are believed to undermine the liquidity and well-functioning of securities markets, and as a result market groups and policymakers have tried to limit them.

Date: 2017-07-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfn:2017-07-03

DOI: 10.17016/2380-7172.1997

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