The interaction of bank leverage, interest-rate risk, and runnable funding

Michele Cavallo and Matthew P. Seay
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Michele Cavallo: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/michele-cavallo.htm

No 2024-08-30-2, FEDS Notes from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Signature Bank, First Republic Bank (FRC) had too little useable liquidity relative to their runnable funding and too little capital given the magnitude of their interest rate risk. The mismanagement of these vulnerabilities ultimately contributed to a loss of confidence in their business models.

Date: 2024-08-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfn:2024-08-30-2

DOI: 10.17016/2380-7172.3605

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