Dynamic bargaining theory

Melvyn Coles and Randall Wright

No 172, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to extend the analysis of strategic bargaining to nonstationary environments, where preferences or opportunities may be changing over time. We are mainly interested in equilibria where trade occurs immediately, once the agents start negotiating, but the terms of trade depend on when the negotiations begin. We characterize equilibria in terms of simply dynamical systems, and compare these outcomes with the myopic Nash bargaining solution. We illustrate the practicality of the approach with an application in monetary economics.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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