The CBO's policy analysis: an unquestionable misuse of a questionable theory

Preston J. Miller and Arthur J. Rolnick

No 49, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: The analyses of fiscal and monetary policies that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides Congress tend to be biased, encouraging the use of activist stabilization policies. The CBO?s virtual neglect of economic uncertainties and its emphasis on very short time horizons make active policies appear much more attractive than its own model implies. Moreover, the CBO?s adoption of the macroeconometric approach fundamentally biases its analyses. Macroeconometric models do not remain invariant to changes in policy rules and are mute on the implications of alternative policies for efficiency and income distribution. The rational expectations equilibrium approach overcomes these difficulties and implies that less activist and less inflationary policies are desirable.

Date: 1979
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Published in Journal of Monetary Economics (Vol. 6, No. 2, April 1980, pp. 171-198)

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