Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity

Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck and Emil Verner

No 1181, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: Bank failures can stem from runs on otherwise solvent banks or from losses that render banks insolvent, regardless of withdrawals. Disentangling the relative importance of liquidity and solvency in explaining bank failures is central to understanding financial crises and designing effective financial stability policies. This paper reviews evidence on the causes of bank failures. Bank failures—both with and without runs—are almost always related to poor fundamentals. Low recovery rates in failure suggest that most failed banks that experienced runs were likely fundamentally insolvent. Examiners’ postmortem assessments also emphasize the primacy of poor asset quality and solvency problems. Before deposit insurance, runs commonly triggered the failure of insolvent banks. However, runs rarely caused the failure of strong banks, as such runs were typically resolved through other mechanisms, including interbank cooperation, equity injections, public signals of strength, or suspension of convertibility. We discuss the policy implications of these findings and outline directions for future research.

Keywords: bank failures; bank runs; liquidity; solvency; banking regulation; supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2026-02-01
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Working Paper: Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity (2026)
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DOI: 10.59576/sr.1181

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