Natural Centralization in Decentralized Finance

Pablo Azar, Adrian Casillas () and Maryam Farboodi ()
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Maryam Farboodi: https://mitsloan.mit.edu/faculty/directory/maryam-farboodi

No 1102, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: Can centralization arise absent barriers to entry? We confront this question by studying the Ethereum blockchain, a market featuring permissionless entry, standardized protocols, and a transparent public ledger. We show that natural centralization emerges when information asymmetry confronts risk-sharing. Using a novel dataset distinguishing private from public order flow, we find that a 1 percent increase in the value of private information causally increases an intermediary’s profit share by 0.57 percent. We use a dynamic bargaining model to illustrate that intermediaries leverage private information by threatening to withhold valuable trades, creating an outside option that sustains their market power. Our results provide causal evidence that information can be a fundamental source of endogenous centralization in the market structure, demonstrating how natural oligopolies can emerge even in purportedly decentralized economies.

Keywords: financial intermediation; oligopoly; blockchain; decentralized finance; cybersecurity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 G14 G23 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2024-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com, nep-fdg, nep-ind, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: Revised August 2025. Previous title: “Information and Market Power in DeFi Intermediation.”
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.59576/sr.1102

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