Event Risk Bond Covenants, Agency Costs of Debt and Equity, and Stockholder Wealth

Sung C. Bae, Daniel P. Klein and Raj Padmaraj

Financial Management, 1994, vol. 23, issue 4

Abstract: We examine the effect of risk covenants in bond indentures on agency costs of debt and equity and stockholder wealth by testing two competing hypotheses for issuing event risk-protected bonds: the stockholder wealth enhancement hypothesis and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. We find that the issuance of event risk-protected bonds has a more positive impact on stockholder wealth than the issuance of non-protected bonds. Regression analysis indicates that more positive stockholder gains are associated with firms characterized by higher agency costs of debt. These findings suggest that the presence of event risk covenants increases stockholder wealth primarily by lowering a firm's agency costs of debt.

Date: 1994
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