Determinants of the Choice of the Hostile Takeover Mechanism: An Empirical Analysis of Tender Offers and Proxy Contests

Uma V. Sridharan and Marc R. Reinganum

Financial Management, 1995, vol. 24, issue 1

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of target firm performance, capital structure, and ownership profile on the decision to pursue a hostile tender offer or, alternatively, a proxy contest. Empirically, firms with poorer financial performance are more likely to experience a proxy contest as opposed to a tender offer. Firms that are more highly leveraged and that tend to be management-controlled are more likely to be targets of proxy contests than of tender offers.

Date: 1995
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