When quality (doesn't) pay: Evidence from two experiments in Uganda

Bjorn Van Campenhout, Richard M. Ariong, Sara Wairimu Kariuki and Jordan Chamberlin

No 2420, IFPRI discussion papers from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Abstract: Quality in agri-food supply chains is often unobservable at first sale and early aggregation limits traceability, weakening incentives for quality provision. We study whether making milk quality visible and traceable creates a market for quality in Uganda’s dairy sector. Increasing observability reduces adulteration and improves quality, but no premium emerges. In a follow-up experiment, we introduce trader quality premiums. This increases quality when binding, yet informed intermediaries capture the gains and farm-gate prices do not rise. Observability is necessary but insufficient: without downstream demand for quality and pass-through by intermediaries, incentives for quality upgrading remain weak.

Keywords: dairying; value chains; enforcement; quality management; quality assurance; quality control; Uganda; Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fpr:ifprid:183322

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