From Partisanship to Preference: How Identity shapes Dependence Aversion

Jana Freundt () and Holger Herz
Additional contact information
Jana Freundt: University of Fribourg, Switzerland, https://janafreundt.net

No 536, FSES Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland

Abstract: We study how individuals’ willingness to delegate choice is affected by heterogeneity in identity between the delegee and the delegate. While it is straightforward that such heterogeneity can affect delegation for instrumental reasons, we show experimentally that divergent identity also causes delegation aversion through purely intrinsic channels. More specifically, we demonstrate that Republicans (Democrats) are intrinsically less averse to delegate decisions over their own outcomes when the delegate also identifies as a Republican (Democrat), compared to when the delegate identifies as a Democrat (Republican). By design, beliefs about the actions of the delegate cannot explain the observed treatment effect. Our finding suggests that contrasting identities impede the creation — or the continuation — of shared institutions that rely on centralization of control beyond what can be explained by purely instrumental reasons.

Keywords: political; jurisdiction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10-28
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/329242/preview/WP_SES_536.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fri:fribow:fribow00536

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/329242

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FSES Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland Bd de Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mustapha Obbad ().