The German System of Corporate Governance - A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated

E Wenger and Christoph Kaserer

Working Papers from American Institute for Contemporary German Studies-

Abstract: It has been discussed for a long time how managers of large corporations can be induced to act in the best interest of owners. According to conventional wisdom the related agency problems are much less important in Germany than in the UK or US. It is widely believed that industrial companies in Germany often have large blockholders, especially banks, which are toughly monitoring the management of their portfolio companies. It will be shown that this conventional wisdom is the result of a fundamental misunderstanding.

Keywords: BUSINESS ORGANIZATION; GERMANY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 78 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:amiger:14

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