Approaching Equilibrium in Parallel

Sjur Flåm

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: Motivated by non-cooperative games we study repeated interaction among non-communicating agents, each dealing with his black of variables, each moving merely on the bases of his marginal payoff and its most recent change. Adjustment of play thus unfolds in parallel. Constrants are accommodated. The main issue is convergence to equilibrium.

Keywords: GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2001
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