Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders

Zvika Neeman () and G.O. Orosel

Working Papers from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner ; s curse. A informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. The buyers have the same ex post valuation of the object but differ in their estimates of what this value is.

Keywords: INFORMATION; AUCTIONS; LEARNING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostec:92

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