The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions

Zvika Neeman ()

Working Papers from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the performance of English and second price auctions in which the seller sets an optimal reserve price given his beliefs. We define the effectivess of an auction as the ration between the expected revenue it generated for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation (total surplus).

Keywords: AUCTIONS; EFFICIENCY; UNITED KINGDOM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions (1998)
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