Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunitic Fraud in Automobile Insurance

Georges Dionne () and Robert Gagné ()

Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques.

Abstract: In this paper we have proposed a methodology to separate moral hazard from adverse selection.

Keywords: ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE; RISQUE MORAL (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Journal Article: Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance (2002)
Working Paper: Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance (2000)
Working Paper: Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:etcori:00-01

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