The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects

P. De Donner and Jean Hindriks

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper studies majority voting over non-linear income taxes when individuals respnd to taxation by substituting untaxable leisure to taxable labor. We first show that voting cycles over progressive and regressive taxes is inevitable. We then investigate three solution to this cycling problem: (i)rducing the policy space to the policies that are ideal for some voter; (ii) weakening the voting equilibrium concept; (iii) assuming parties also care about the size of their majority.

Keywords: TAXATION; INCOME; LABOUR; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects (2003)
Working Paper: The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects (2003)
Working Paper: The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:00-542

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