Optimal Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises

Giacomo Calzolari ()

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have started to populate also regulated sector. Their linked international activities and credible threats to relocate are then new concerns for regulators. We sutdy a multiprincipal model in which a privately informed MNE (the agent) produces for two countries and is regulated by the two national authorities (the principals).

Keywords: REGULATION; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.523

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