Tunnelling

Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under what circumstances it is legal. We discuss two important legal principles--the duty of care and the duty of loyalty--which courts use to analyze involving tunnelling. Several important legal cases from France, Belgium, and Italy illustrate how and why the law accommodaates tunnelling in civil law countries, and why certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/fth/harver/hier1887.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tunneling (2000)
Working Paper: Tunneling (2000)
Working Paper: Tunnelling (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:harver:1887

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().