Imperfect Monitoring and the Free-rider Problem in Tariff Lobbying

Hafiz Akhand ()

Working Papers from New South Wales - School of Economics

Abstract: This paper extends the infinitely repeated tariff lobbying game of Pecorino [8] to allow for imperfect monitoring, and revisits the question of how an industry's ability to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by the number of firms in the industry. The paper demonstrated that Pecorino [8] finding that there is nothing in the underlying structure of payouts which guarantees that cooperation must breakdown as the number of grows large is not robust.

Keywords: LOBBYING; SOCIAL CHOICE; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nesowa:99/3

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