Regulation of Industry-Specific Externalities under Private Information

Petter Osmundsen

Working Papers from Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-

Abstract: Optimal regulation is developed for a case where heterogeneous firms expand or reduce the supply of an industry-specific public good. The sizes of the individual contributions or reductions are subject to private information, implying that external effects are present both in the firms' net incomes and in the information rents.

Keywords: EXTERNALITIES; INFORMATION; REGULATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:norgee:1/97

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