Optimal Compensation Contracts with Pay-For-Performance and Termination Incentives

Greg Hallman and Jay C. Hartzell

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

Abstract: This paper studies optimal compensation contracts in the presence of both pay-for-performance and termination incentives. While these incentives have been studied independently, this paper’s model is the first to incorporate both. The primary result is

Date: 1999-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/fin/workpapers/papers99/wpa99053.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.stern.nyu.edu/fin/workpapers/papers99/wpa99053.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.stern.nyu.edu/fin/workpapers/papers99/wpa99053.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-053

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().