Agency Costs in the Process of Development

Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: We analyze an economy where production is subject to moral hazard. The degree of the incentive (agency) costs introduced by the presence of moral hazard naturally depends on the information structure in the economy; it is cheaper to induce correct incentives in a society which prossesses better ex port information.

Keywords: INFORMATION; FINANCIAL MARKET; MACROECONOMICS; FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E44 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Agency costs in the process of development (1997)
Working Paper: Agency Costs in the Process of Development (1996)
Working Paper: Agency Costs in the Process of Development (1996)
Working Paper: Agency costs in the process of development (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:607

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