Saving Behaviour in Stationary Equilibrium with Random Discounting

Edi Karni and Itzhak Zilcha

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: In this paper we study the implications of random discount rates of future generations for saving behavior and capital holdings in steady-state competitive equilibrium. We examine conditions under which this randomness is sufficient for households other than the most patient to save, thus providing a simple and natural way to overcome a difficulty encountered in deterministic models.

Keywords: SAVINGS; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; UNCERTAINTY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D80 D91 E21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Saving behavior in stationary equilibrium with random discounting (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:29-98

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Tel Aviv Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().