Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages, and Involuntary Unemployment

Nils Gottfries (nils.gottfries@nek.uu.se) and Tomas Sjostrom

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: Recent analyses of wage bargaining has emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders, yet one typically assumes that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage. We consider a model where the starting wage for outsiders may be lower that the insider wage, but incentive constraints associated with turnover affect the form of the contract. We examine under what conditions the starting wage is linked to the insider wage so that increased bargaining power of insiders raises the starting wage and reduces hiring of outsiders.

Keywords: WAGES; BARGAINING; UNEMPLOYMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J23 J31 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages and Involuntary Unemployment (2000)
Working Paper: Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages, and Involuntary Unemployment (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:1998-10

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