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Reverse-Demand-Response-Based Power Stabilization in Isolated Microgrid

Seungchan Jeon, Jangkyum Kim () and Seong Gon Choi ()
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Seungchan Jeon: Department of Artificial Intelligence and Data Science, Sejong University, 209 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul 05006, Republic of Korea
Jangkyum Kim: Department of Artificial Intelligence and Data Science, Sejong University, 209 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul 05006, Republic of Korea
Seong Gon Choi: School of Information and Communication Engineering, Chungbuk National University, Chungdae-ro 1, Seowon-gu, Cheongju-si 28644, Republic of Korea

Energies, 2025, vol. 18, issue 15, 1-14

Abstract: This paper introduces a reverse demand response scheme that uses electric vehicles in an isolated microgrid system, aiming to solve the renewable energy curtailment issue. We focus on an off-grid system where the system operator faces a stabilization problem due to surplus energy production, while electric vehicles seek to charge energy at a lower price. In our system model, the operator determines the incentive to encourage more charging facilities and electric vehicles to participate in the reverse demand response program. Charging facilities, acting as brokers, use a portion of these incentives to further encourage electric vehicle engagement. Electric vehicles follow the decisions made by the broker and system operator to determine their charging strategy within the system. Consequently, charging energy and incentives are allocated to the electric vehicles in proportion to their decisions. The paper investigates the economic benefits of individual participants and the contribution of power stabilization by implementing a hierarchical decision-making heterogeneous multi-leaders multi-followers Stackelberg game. By demonstrating the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium, we show the effectiveness of the proposed model in an isolated microgrid environment.

Keywords: microgrid; reverse demand response; Stackelberg game; renewable energy curtailment; cost optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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