Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer

Jijian Fan ()
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Jijian Fan: School of Economics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China

Games, 2023, vol. 14, issue 5, 1-8

Abstract: We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round. Our analysis demonstrates that when the initial transfer is large enough, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium consists of a finite number of rounds of delay before an agreement is reached. The equilibrium delay is longer when the players are more patient, and when the transfer is initially higher and depreciates slower. Nevertheless, the game’s chaotic characteristic makes it arduous to forecast the exact number of delayed rounds or which player will make the ultimate decision. This game can be applied to many social scenarios, particularly those with exogenous costs.

Keywords: bargaining; delay; indivisibility; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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