Procedural Information as a “Game Changer” in School Choice

Yoan Hermstrüwer ()
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Yoan Hermstrüwer: Law Faculty, University of Zurich, Rämistrasse 74, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland

Games, 2025, vol. 16, issue 3, 1-36

Abstract: This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale–Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increases truth-telling and stability under the Gale–Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to the prevailing assumptions in matching theory, the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural transparency and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be sufficient to foster fairness and mitigate litigation risks.

Keywords: matching markets; school choice; deferred acceptance; immediate acceptance; advice; fairness; law and market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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