Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks

Marco Tomassini and Enea Pestelacci
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Marco Tomassini: Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
Enea Pestelacci: Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 3, 1-20

Abstract: We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts. We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; coordination games; games on dynamical networks; co-evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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