Evolutionary Game Analysis of Abandoned-Bike-Sharing Recycling: Impact of Recycling Subsidy Policy

Limei Liu, Zhe Liu (), Yi Yang, Biao Shi and Xingbao Liu
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Limei Liu: School of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Hunan University of Technology and Business, Changsha 410205, China
Zhe Liu: School of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Hunan University of Technology and Business, Changsha 410205, China
Yi Yang: School of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Hunan University of Technology and Business, Changsha 410205, China
Biao Shi: School of Resources and Environment, Hunan University of Technology and Industry, Changsha 410205, China
Xingbao Liu: School of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Hunan University of Technology and Business, Changsha 410205, China

Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 11, 1-27

Abstract: The launch of large-scale bike sharing in China has effectively met the demand for low-carbon short-distance travel, but it has also led to the emergence of a large number of abandoned bikes, which is called the “bike-sharing siege”. In order to achieve the sustainable development of the bike-sharing industry, this paper discusses how to encourage bike-sharing companies to recycle and reuse abandoned bikes and improve the efficiency of local government financial resources based on the promotion of the EPR system. We apply the evolutionary game to investigate the interaction mechanism of complex behaviors between local governments and bike-sharing companies under two subsidy policies: a fixed recycling subsidy and regressive recycling subsidy. The results show that both recycling subsidy policies have diminishing marginal effects. In addition to incentives, local governments need to unify bike-sharing parking, establish bike-sharing monitoring platforms, and reasonably allocate bike parking spaces to ensure the quality of the urban environment. Under effective regulation, by implementing a regressive recycling subsidy policy and setting a rational amount for the recycling subsidy, local governments can effectively promote the EPR system, strengthen the environmental responsibility of companies, and avoid the “free-rider phenomenon”. Based on the current situation in China, this research provides references for each local government to formulate management policies from the perspective of subsidy policy.

Keywords: bike sharing; extended producer responsibility system; evolutionary game; subsidy policy; reverse logistics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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