Research on Psychological Crisis Intervention Strategies under Emergencies: An Analysis Based on the Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Lei Chen (), Hongxia Li, Fangyuan Tian (), Can Xie and Lin Zhao
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Lei Chen: College of Safety Science and Engineering, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China
Hongxia Li: College of Safety Science and Engineering, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China
Fangyuan Tian: Institute of Safety and Emergency Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China
Can Xie: Institute of Safety and Emergency Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China
Lin Zhao: College of Safety Science and Engineering, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China

Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 21, 1-28

Abstract: The study of multi-subject psychological crisis intervention under emergencies is of great significance for maintaining the psychological states of public groups. A government’s strict regulation can stimulate social responsibility in medical institutions and communities, increase the probability that positive behavioral strategies might be chosen, and accelerate the implementation of psychological crisis intervention. In this paper, we constructed a four-party dynamic evolutionary game model containing the government, medical institutions, communities, and the public; analyzed the asymptotic stability conditions of the behavioral strategies of each player in the game; and explored the impact of the changes of the relevant key parameters in the model on the strategic choices of the players via use of Matlab 2020a simulation. The results of the study show that there are complex interactions and competitive relationships between the subjects of the game in emergencies, and that different intervention strategies can have different impacts on the behavior and outcomes of the subjects. The accountability of superiors increases the probability that there will be strict government regulation and enhances the robustness of medical institutions and communities to choose positive behaviors. A government’s decision to increase incentives and penalties may urge healthcare providers to provide active treatment and the community to provide safety and security, while also reducing the cost of public participation in supervision and reducing resource waste. By analyzing strategic choices made by subjects under a four-party game, a perfect countermeasure can be formulated to help the public form a positive psychological coping mechanism in the event of emergencies, and to provide support and help for their peers. Thus, the psychological health of the group can be better maintained, and extreme negative emotions and behaviors can be avoided. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate the rationality of the research conclusions and provide reference suggestions by which to improve the psychological crisis intervention system.

Keywords: psychological crisis intervention; four-party evolutionary game; behavioral decision-making; evolutionary stability strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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