Research on Environmental Pollution Control Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game in China’s New-Type Urbanization

Qianxing Ding (), Lianying Zhang and Shanshan Huang
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Qianxing Ding: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Lianying Zhang: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Shanshan Huang: Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 0FA, UK

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 15, 1-19

Abstract: The inconsistency of interests among local governments, polluting companies, and the public reduces the efficiency of environmental pollution control, posing a significant challenge in harmonizing these interests to achieve environmental sustainability in China’s new-type urbanization. To elucidate the strategic decision-making rules of each party in environmental pollution control, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model and analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), identifying the influencing factors of the parties’ strategies. Subsequently, numerical simulations are used to examine the asymptotic stability of various ESS and the effects of parameter variation on these ESS. The results indicate the existence of optimal ESS wherein all three parties adopt environmentally friendly strategies. Specifically, local governments can mitigate expenses for polluting companies to implement low-pollution strategies, while concurrently facilitating public participation in pollution control. Public participation can enhance the supervisory capabilities of local governments and exert a positive influence on polluting companies. Furthermore, the simulation results suggest that the ESS of the parties can evolve into the expected ESS by adjusting the influencing factors reasonably, thereby supporting environmental sustainability in China’s new-type urbanization.

Keywords: environmental pollution control; tripartite evolutionary game; numerical simulation; new-type urbanization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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