On High-Value Mixed Cropping System: Four-Way Evolutionary Game Analysis of HMC Synergy of Circular and Sharing Economy for Multiple Low-to-Middle-Income Farmer Families

Duc Nghia Vu (), Truc Le Nguyen, Mai Huong Nguyen Thi, Gia Kuop Nguyen, Duc Binh Vo, Ngoc Anh Nguyen and Huy Duc Nguyen
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Duc Nghia Vu: Faculty of Development Economics, VNU University of Economics and Business, Hanoi 100000, Vietnam
Truc Le Nguyen: Faculty of Development Economics, VNU University of Economics and Business, Hanoi 100000, Vietnam
Mai Huong Nguyen Thi: Faculty of Development Economics, VNU University of Economics and Business, Hanoi 100000, Vietnam
Gia Kuop Nguyen: Faculty of Development Economics, VNU University of Economics and Business, Hanoi 100000, Vietnam
Duc Binh Vo: Faculty of Finance and Banking, VNU University of Economics and Business, Hanoi 100000, Vietnam
Ngoc Anh Nguyen: Faculty of Finance and Banking, VNU University of Economics and Business, Hanoi 100000, Vietnam
Huy Duc Nguyen: Faculty of Information Technology, Thuyloi University, Hanoi 100000, Vietnam

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 17, 1-26

Abstract: This paper introduces a novel four-party evolutionary game model to analyze cooperation dynamics in High-Value Mixed Cropping (HMC) systems integrating non-pesticide cacao, cashew nut, and free-range chicken farming within circular and sharing economy frameworks. The model uniquely examines strategic interactions among local government and three farming family types (cacao, cashew, and chicken), incorporating both regulatory mechanisms and cooperative behaviors. Through rigorous stability analysis and MATLAB simulations based on empirical data from Southeast Vietnam, we identify precise conditions for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) that sustain long-term cooperation. Our results demonstrate that government incentives (subsidies, technical support) and reputational sanctions critically shape farmers’ and consumers’ payoffs, thereby steering the system toward collective action equilibria. In particular, increasing the strength of positive incentives or reputational benefits enlarges the basin of attraction for full-cooperation ESSs, regardless of initial strategy distributions. Conversely, overly punitive sanctions can destabilize collaborative outcomes. These findings underscore the pivotal role of well-balanced policy instruments in fostering resilience, innovation, and resource circulation within rural agroecosystems. Finally, we propose targeted policy recommendations, such as graduated subsidy schemes, participatory monitoring platforms, and cooperative branding initiatives, to reinforce circular economy practices and accelerate progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

Keywords: high-value mixed cropping system; sharing economy; circular economy; rural agriculture; climate change; poverty alleviation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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