 Market Share, R&D Cooperation, and EU Competition PolicyRichard Ruble and Bruno Versaevel No 910, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Abstract: Current EU policy exempts horizontal R&D agreements from antitrust con- cerns when the combined market shares of participants are low enough. This paper argues that existing theory does not support limiting the exemption to low market shares. This is done by introducing a set of non-innovating outside ï¬ rms to the standard framework to assess what link might exist between the market share of innovating ï¬ rms and the product market beneï¬ ts of cooperation. With R&D output choices, the market share criterion, while it rules out the most so- cially harmful R&D cooperation agreements, also hinders the most beneï¬ cial ones. With R&D input choices, cooperation may actually be desirable in concentrated industries, and harmful in more competitive ones. If R&D cooperation does have anti-competitive effects in product markets, it seems that these are therefore best addressed by other tools than market share criteria. Keywords: R&D; Cooperation; Competition; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0910 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC. |
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