Abram Bergson

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard (), Subhadip Chakrabarti () and Sudipta Sarangi ()
Additional contact information
Christophe Bravard: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; Université Grenoble 2, UMR 1215 GAEL F3800 Grenoble, France
Subhadip Chakrabarti: School of Management and Economics, Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom
Sudipta Sarangi: Department of Economics, Virginia Tech and Louisiana State University

No 1339, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

Keywords: R&D Collaborations; Network Formation; Multi-market Oligopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D85 L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1339

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