Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion

Anton Suvorov, Jeroen van de Ven () and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Jeroen van de Ven: Tinbergen Institute and Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam. Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Marie Claire Villeval: CNRS, GATE, 35 rue Raulin, F-69007, Lyon, France

No 2405, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: Although they usually manage to combine information to make well-informed decisions, groups also make mistakes. We investigate experimentally one source of sub-optimal decision-making by groups: the selective and asymmetric sharing of ego-relevant information within teams. We show that good news about one’s performance is shared more often with team members than bad news. Asymmetric information sharing combined with the receivers’ selection neglect boosts team confidence compared to an unbiased exchange of feedback. Consequently, weaker teams make worse investment decisions in bets whose success depends on the team’s ability. The endogenous social exchange of ego-relevant information may foster detrimental group delusion.

Keywords: Group Delusion; Information Disclosure; Beliefs; Skepticism; Social Image; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D83 D84 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:2405

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