EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting

Margherita Comola (), Agnieszka Rusinowska () and Marie Claire Villeval ()
Additional contact information
Margherita Comola: Université Paris-Saclay (RITM) and Paris School of Economics
Agnieszka Rusinowska: CES, CNRS - University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics
Marie Claire Villeval: CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany

No 2411, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes’initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avoid nodes targeted by the opponent. Targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the distribution of initial opinions.

Keywords: Network; Influence; Targeting; Competition; Laboratory Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D85 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2024/2411.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:2411

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly Wirth ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:2411