Why So Many Representatives? Extending the Cube Root Law to Local Assemblies

Benoît Le Maux () and Sonia Paty
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Benoît Le Maux: University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS

No 2414, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We investigate the impact of territorial fragmentation on political representation by applying Taagepera’s cube root law to subnational governments. Our model reveals that the total number of local representatives is more elastic to changes in the number of jurisdictions (elasticity e = 2/3) than to variations in population size (e = 1/3), a relationship we refer to as the law of 2/3. As a result, political representation is amplified in fragmented areas. Empirical evidence from diverse datasets supports this new law.

Keywords: Representative Democracy; Decentralization; Local public sector; Cube Root Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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https://www.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2024/2414.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Why So Many Representatives? Extending the Cube Root Law to Local Assemblies (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:2414

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