EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Visa Quotas, Undocumented Migration, and Skill Selection

Giorgio Fabbri

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: We study how expanding official migration channels affects the size and composition of inflows when individuals with heterogeneous income choose between staying, applying for a rationed legal visa, or attempting undocumented migration. We characterize the equilibrium sorting, showing that official channels attract intermediate-income agents while the undocumented route attracts those with lower incomes. Increasing visa quotas replaces a mass of undocumented migrants with official applicants: while this shift reduces irregularity and alters the skill composition of arrivals, we find that it can paradoxically reduce the total number of migrants. This “crowding-in reversal” occurs when the policy triggers an excessive displacement from the always-accessible undocumented path to the rationed official lottery.

Keywords: Visa Quotas; Undocumented Migration; Equilibrium Sorting; Skill Selection; Migration Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 F22 J24 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2026-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/default/ ... 2024/gael2026-07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2026-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adrien Hervouet ().

 
Page updated 2026-11-17
Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2026-07