Effective Threat, Ineffective Action: The Narrow Influence of the ICC on State Killings in Venezuela

Rui Alleyne () and Jose Morales-Arilla ()
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Rui Alleyne: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello
Jose Morales-Arilla: School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey

No 40, Working Paper Series of the School of Government and Public Transformation from School of Government and Public Transformation

Abstract: The study assesses whether International Criminal Court actions deter state violence in Venezuela. Using a regression discontinuity design with state-perpetrated killings data from 2016 to 2024, it finds that the 2018 referral significantly reduced killings by nationally commanded security forces, but the 2020 prosecutorial determination had no comparable effect. Deterrence appears to operate when prosecution can still be avoided through moderation.

Keywords: Corte Penal Internacional; violencia estatal; disuasión; derechos humanos; Venezuela. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2026-08
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