Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Dynamic Markets

Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty

No 2025-22, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: Digital platforms, ecosystems, and R&D-intensive industries challenge conventional, one-shot merger control. In fast-evolving markets, competitive constraints and innovation trajectories can shift after clearance, while behavioral commitments – often imposed for long durations – are exposed to obsolescence, moral hazard during implementation, and adverse selection rooted in imperfect information at notification. We propose a conceptual model of adaptive merger control that introduces structured ex post flexibility through a review clause attached to conditional clearance. The clause can be activated within a predefined window when observable triggers indicate that the original package has become ineffective or disproportionate. We outline governance options for initiation by authorities, merging parties, or affected stakeholders; information tools for dynamic counterfactuals; and a continuum of remedy designs distinguishing fixed commitments, adaptable behavioral remedies, and regulation-like constraints. The framework highlights two symmetric enforcement errors – excessive restraint and excessive precaution – and shows how adaptive design can mitigate both while preserving legal certainty via transparent procedures and bounded discretion. We discuss implementation challenges, including monitoring capacity, strategic gaming, and the potential transition from behavioral to structural measures. The article provides a framework for remedy design in dynamic markets and for the assessment of merger chains in digital and innovation markets.

Keywords: Merger Control; Merger Remedies; Behavioral Remedies; Dynamic Competition; Legal Uncertainty; Innovation; Digital Markets; Mergers & Acquisitions; Merger Waves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L12 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2025-06, Revised 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Forthcoming in World Competition

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-22

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