Robust Median Voter Rules

Steven Kivinen () and Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()
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Steven Kivinen: University of Graz, Austria
Norovsambuu Tumennasan: Dalhousie University, Canada

No 2025-15, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: Generalized median voter (GMV) rules on the single-peaked preference domain are group strategy-proof. We show that if incomplete information coexists with the ability to commit to coalitional agreements, then GMV rules can be susceptible to insincere voting by groups with heterogeneous beliefs. We identify strategic compromise as a novel source of insincere voting in this environment. Our two main results characterize the set of fair, efficient, and robust voting rules: those that ensure sincere voting under asymmetric information and coalition formation. Each result uses a different notion of robustness, and both give (at most) two alternatives special treatment, with the remaining alternatives chosen according to a type of consensus.

Keywords: robust group strategy-proofness; voting; median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D70 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-mic
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