Compromise and compensation in collective choice

Andreas Darmann (), Daniel Eckert () and Christian Klamler ()
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Andreas Darmann: University of Graz, Austria
Daniel Eckert: University of Graz, Austria
Christian Klamler: University of Graz, Austria

No 2026-17, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: A compromise lies between the positions it reconciles, so betweenness is the minimal primitive for compromise. We impose two requirements on collective choice over product betweenness spaces. Compromise preservation makes the outcome of a unilateral change lie between the status quo outcome and every outcome reachable by a countermove of the others. Minimal compensation lets every pivotal move be offset so that its outcome becomes an endpoint. Preservation forces centrality, compensation forces extremality, and product betweenness is too flat to keep them apart: only constant rules survive. Compromise needs more geometry than a bare product.

Keywords: collective choice; compromise; compensation; betweenness; product betweenness; median spaces (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
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