Ordering Data to Persuade

Steven Kivinen (), Tatiana Mayskaya () and Arina Nikandrova ()
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Steven Kivinen: University of Graz, Austria
Tatiana Mayskaya: International College of Economics and Finance
Arina Nikandrova: University of London, UK

No 2026-21, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: A sender must disclose all available signals but commits to their order to persuade a receiver who pays to observe them sequentially and can stop at any time. Front loading favourable signals is generally suboptimal. With many weak signals, an asymptotically optimal policy uses the first signal to encode a recommendation based on the entire sample, then alternates favourable and unfavourable signals to postpone revelation of the sample composition and deter further learning. This policy makes the dynamic ordering problem asymptotically equivalent to static persuasion with costly verification.

Keywords: information design; costly information acquisition; optimal stopping; primacy effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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