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Changing the Yardstick: Welfare Rankings and Policy Choice

Alexander Hansak ()
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Alexander Hansak: University of Graz, Austria

No 2026-29, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: Averaging household consumption-equivalent variations (CEVs) can reverse the ranking of fixed policy outcomes solely by changing the reporting reference. Yet, an algebraically possible reversal may require an economically indefensible reference and need not change the policy selected from a broader menu. I develop a framework for determining when reference dependence affects policy recommendations rather than merely reported welfare comparisons. Under an equivalent-level representation, changing the reference reweights fixed household welfare differences. I derive sharp first-tie thresholds, characterize when a single reference supports a policy against all alternatives simultaneously, and establish robustness certificates for restricted reference families. An exact fixed-reference scaling identity extends the analysis to nonhomothetic preferences. Three applications demonstrate why these distinctions matter. In an analytical optimal-tax model, model-generated reference changes shift the progressivity parameter preferred by mean CEV from 0.093 to 0.058 and change the winner of a finite policy menu. In a housing-tax model, the preferred reform survives three solved-policy references and a restricted household-equivalent envelope despite substantial disagreement among households. In a tariff-recycling model, two financing instruments reverse their pairwise ranking at a sharp projective radius of 0.307 within a four-group reference class preserving both goods' initial-period totals. This restriction does not establish intertemporal implementability, and the broader financing-menu winner remains robust over substantially larger reference changes. The framework thus distinguishes sensitivity of welfare reporting from fragility of policy recommendations, conditional on economically justified reference restrictions and the available policy menu.

Keywords: consumption-equivalent variation; welfare aggregation; reporting reference; robust policy choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D60 D63 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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