The Effect of Earnings Management and Signaling on Loss Loan Provision: The Role of Bank Capitalization

Jasman ()
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Jasman: Universitas Trisaksi, Indonesia Author-2-Name: Etty Murwaningsari Author-2-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Trisakti, Indonesia Author-3-Name: Sekar Mayangsari Author-3-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Trisakti, Indonesia Author-4-Name: Susi Dwi Mulyani Author-4-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Trisakti, Indonesia Author-5-Name: Author-5-Workplace-Name: Author-6-Name: Author-6-Workplace-Name: Author-7-Name: Author-7-Workplace-Name: Author-8-Name: Author-8-Workplace-Name:

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Abstract: " Objective - Loan loss provision is an accrual for the banking industry, and therefore has a significant effect on bank accounting earnings and capital requirements. Previous studies showed inconsistent results for the relationship between earnings management, signaling, and loan loss provision. The difference in the results is thought to be caused by bank capitalization. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the role of bank capitalization on the effect of earnings management and signaling on loan loss provision. Methodology � The sample consists of 86 conventional banks in Indonesia for the period of 2015-2019. Furthermore, this study used panel data analysis of multiple regression. Findings � The results showed earnings management has no effect on loan loss provision. In contrast, signaling has a positive and significant effect. Although bank capitalization is not proven to weaken the effect of earnings management on loan loss provision, it strengthens the positive effect of signaling on loan loss provision. Novelty � This study proves that bank capitalization has an important role in moderating signaling impact on loan loss provision but not for the effect of earnings management. This is due to the potential for earnings management in banks is relatively low because banks are highly regulated entities and with regulated governance mechanisms limit the managers' discretionary accounting decisions. Type of Paper - Empirical"

Keywords: Bank Capitalization; Earnings Management; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8
Date: 2021-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-ban and nep-sea
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Published in Journal of Finance and Banking Review, Volume 6, Issue 1

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gtr:gatrjs:jfbr183

DOI: 10.35609/jfbr.2021.6.1(1)

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