The Existence and Uniqueness of Optimal Pollution Policy in the Presence of Victim Defense Measures

Ross McKitrick and R.A. Collinge

Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: It is to be expected that rational peole defend themselves against pollution externalities, at the very least through spatial separation from the source. Bu even in the simplist models, defensive generates nonconvexities, multiple optima, and inconclusive policy guidance. This calls into question the theory of environmental policy, yet the problem has been largely ignored. This paper derives a sufficient condition for a uniquely optimal emissions level in the presence of defensive activity.

Keywords: POLLUTION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q25 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The Existence and Uniqueness of Optimal Pollution Policy in the Presence of Victim Defense Measures (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:1998-6

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