Contests for Pricing Externalities with Free Entry of Injurers and Victims

Ross McKitrick

Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: Two methods for pricing an externality -taxes and strict liability- are modeled as lobbying contests with endogenous numbers of participants. In the tax contest, a regulator is susceptible to lobbying by polluters and victims. Under liability, the court's view is affected by legal representation.

Keywords: EXTERNALITIES; LAW; ENVIRONMENT; TAXATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 K13 K32 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:2000-3

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